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Abstract: We survey the most important results and some recent developments about the secure key exchange protocol where the
security is based on the Second Law of Thermodynamics and the robustness of classical physical information. We conclude that a
classical physical system offers a higher level of control and security during the communication. We also mention some recent attempts
inspired by this communicator to create other systems where Alice and Bob do not form an organic single system and/or the Second Law
is irrelevant. It seems philosophically that they cannot be unconditionally secure, however it is yet an open question how to crack them;
how can they be best used for conditionally secure communications, and what are the practical implications.
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1. Introduction
Very recently, it has been shown that electrical random
noises can be utilized for communication and computing as
information carrier with various peculiar properties.
Examples are Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-(like)-Noise (KLJN)
based secure communication [1-3], Zero-Signal-Power
(stealth) Communication [4], and Noise-based logic
(continuum [5,6] or spike [7] noise based - brain-mimic).
One of the interesting results of these studies is that these
noise-based schemes, which are classical physical systems,
look competitive alternatives of quantum informatics: both
quantum communication [1-3] and quantum computing [6].
Moreover [7], they serve a potential explanation to explain
the brain logic and to mimic this brain logic scheme by
electrical circuits.
2. Secure key exchange utilizing the laws of physics
In today's software-based secure communications (tools we
use when connect our bank via the internet), before the
secure data exchange can start, the two communicators
(Alice and Bob) must generate and share a joint secret
(secure) encryption key through the communication
channel while the eavesdropper (Eve) is supposedly
monitoring the related data (Fig. 1). This is a
mathematically impossible task with current software
methods thus they are only "computationally safe" that is
Eve can decode the data but it takes too long time. Thus, if
Eve had a genuine powerful algorithm or a sufficiently fast
computer with standard algorithms, she could extract the
secure key and decrypt the communicated data with a
reasonable speed. Because new algorithms and computing
solutions are continuously researched, today's software-
based secure communication is a potential time bomb.
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Figure 1. The two communicators (Alice and Bob) must generate and
share a joint secure key through the communication channel while the
eavesdropper (Eve) is monitoring the related data. This is an
impossible task with software methods thus currently used software
methods are only "computationally safe", which means they are
potential time bombs.
Quantum key distribution (see [8-10] and references
therein), due to Stephen Wiesner (1970's); Charles H.
Bennett and Gilles Brassard (1984); and Artur Ekert (1990),
has offered a solution that is claimed to be unconditionally
secure. The information bits are carried by single photons
(Fig. 2). Here the no-cloning-theorem of quantum physics
is the theoretical foundation of security. It means that a
single photon cannot be copied without noise (error). If Eve
captures and measures the photon, it gets destroyed and she
must regenerate and reinject it into the channel otherwise
this bit will be considered invalid by Alice and Bob.
However, due to the no-cloning rule, while Eve is doing
that, she introduces noise and the error rate in the channel
will become greater than without eavesdropping. Therefore,
by evaluating the error statistics, after analyzing a number
of transmitted bits and their errors, Alice and Bob will
discover the eavesdropping with a certain probability.
However, no quantum communicator is secure against the
advanced type of the man-in-the-middle-attack, where Eve
breaks the channel and installs two quantum
communicators in the line. With one of them she will
communicate with Alice and pretends that she is Bob and
with the other one she will communicate with Bob and
pretends that she is Alice. This is one example, where the
secure wire communicator described in the next section is
superior to quantum encryption.
Many quantum communicators have been reportedly built,
up to the range of a ?200 km model line, (Toshiba and
NTT) where the bit exchange rate is less than 0.25
bit/second [10]. Most of them are working through optical
fibers and some of the most advanced and secure ones are
able to communicate via air. However, the experimental
testing of different breaking ideas can be more expensive
than to build the communicators themselves! Therefore,
because this technology is extremely expensive, today's
quantum security against the various breaking attempts is
mostly theoretical, with a vast amount of theoretical-only
papers about proposed breaking methods. It means that,
say, only about 10% of the necessary experimental work is
done for the existing prototypes (because there are many
theoretical ways to break into a quantum channel) and, say,
the 90%, which is testing and enhancements based on the
test, must still be done before these quantum devices can be
marketable on a large scale.
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Figure 2. Generic quantum communication arrangement. To detect
the eavesdropper, a statistics of bit errors must be built. That requires
a sufficiently large number of bits. The communication of just a few
bits is not secure.
3. The secure communicator based on classical
thermodynamics
Recently, an unconditionally secure classical-physical
communication scheme, the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-(like)-
Noise (KLJN) communicator has been proposed [1-3, 11],
which is a statistical-physical competitor of quantum
communicators. The security against passive attacks
(passive voltage and/or current measurements) is based on
the Second Law of Thermodynamics: that is the
impossibility of building a perpetual motion machine of the
second kind. Its security against active attacks (injecting or
extracting current from the channel) is based on the
robustness of classical physical information implying that
the current and voltage data can be continuously monitored
in the line. The KLJN system contains two identical pairs of
resistors (Fig. 3). The logic-low (L) and logic-high (H)
resistors, 
  
R
0
 and 
  
R
1
 , are randomly selected at the beginning
of each clock period and are driven by their own Johnson-
noise (thermal noise) voltages or alternatively by the
electronically enhanced versions (Johnson-like noise) with
a publicly agreed common, nominal temperature. The
practical realizations contain more elements, such as filters,
amplitude control units, etc. A secure key bit is generated
and exchanged when the resistor values at the two ends
differ.
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Figure 3. The fully protected KLJN system. To detect the invasive
eavesdropper (represented for example by the current generator at the
middle), the instantaneous current and voltage data measured at the
two ends are broadcasted and compared. The eavesdropping is
detected immediately, within much shorter period than the time
needed to transfer a single bit. Statistics of bit errors is not needed.
The communication of even a single bit is secure. Low-pass line filters
are necessary to protect against out-of-alarm-frequency-band breaking
attempts. False alarms would occur due to any wave effect (transient
or propagation effects), illegal frequency components or external
disturbance of the current-voltage-balance in the wire.
The role of the Johnson (-like) noise is the determination of
the total resistance in the loop without serving information
to Eve about the actual location of 
  
R
0
 and 
  
R
1
 . When the
total loop resistance gets known (this information is
available to the public, too) and when it is the sum of 
  
R
0
and R
1
 ,  Alice and Bob can calculate the resistance value at
the other side since they know their own resistance values.
The KLJN cypher is naturally protected against the man-in-
the-middle attack [11], see Fig. 4, and, in the same way, the
active eavesdropping is detected immediately [1,11], within
much shorter period than the time needed to transfer a
single bit. Statistics of bit errors is not needed. The
communication of even a single bit is secure.
It is important to note that both the quantum and classical
claims about unconditional security outlined above are
about the idealized systems (mathematical model level). In
practical applications, no physical system is ideal and there
are parasite effects and elements. Therefore, in practical
applications, neither the quantum nor the KLJN systems are
totally secure. However, knowing their mathematical
model, their security and other performance can be
designed depending on physical and financial limits. The
ultimate test of security must be experimental: before
marketing a secure communicator must be tested by all the
known breaking methods.
In [12] it was pointed that, due to the continuous
monitoring and comparison of the voltage and current data
at the two ends of the channel, Alice and Bob always
exactly know Eve's information provided Eve is making the
best possible guessing. Then Alive and Bob exactly knows
if Eve is right or wrong when she estimates a key bit. This
feature is another unique characteristics of the KLJN
system among secure communicators.
In [13], a KLJN network scheme was developed which is
able to generate and share keys with high speed over a
chain network of KLJN units instead of the usual point-to-
point connected systems.
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Figure 4. An example for the man-at-the-middle-attack when Eve
uses resistors with the same values and noise voltage generators with
the same parameters as those of the sender and the receiver [11]. In
the two separate loops the current noises are totally independent thus
the attack is immediately discovered within a fraction of the clock
duration. Zero bit can be extracted and the alarm goes on. The man-in-
the-middle-attack is one of the weakest type of attacks against the
KLJN cipher. This property is unique among known communicators.
There have been several attempts of breaking into the
KLJN cypher, see: [14] with response [15]; [16] with
response [17]; and [18] with response [12]. However
neither of them, not even the correct proposals, could
extract any information from the idealized system. [14] and
[16] utilized non-idealities to create a small information
leak, which can however be arbitrarily reduced (depending
on resources) by proper design approaching the idealistic
situation. The remaining information leak can be removed
by privacy amplifiers, which are software-based tools used
also by quantum communicators for similar purpose. Out of
these, the unique feature mentioned above that Alice and
Bob always knows when Eve is right or wrong, can also be
utilized for defense [12].
Finally, the cracking claims in [18] were based on strongly
unphysical assumptions (see the proof in [12]), such as a
cable impedance corresponding to cable diameters greater
by 28000 times than the size of the known universe [12].
Moreover, in [18], a circulator-based "imitation" of the
KLJN system was introduced with the claim that it is more
advantageous than the KLJN cypher. However, in [12] it
was shown that the circulator-based system is vulnerable
against the man-in-the-middle-attack which means it is not
a competitor of the original KLJN system.
Figure 5. The KLJN wire communicator network element
(communicator pair) tested for ranges of 2-2000km. Its fidelity is
99.98% and it is protected against all known types of attack.
    PCU
    RAM
H Drive 1
H Drive 2
BUS
Figure 6. Example for securing a subsystem of a PCU, a RAM and
two hard drives. Solid arrows: KLJN connections; Block arrows:
classical data bus connections. Each unit has 3 KLJN communicators
integrated on their chip. The required number of KLJN units/chip is
N-1 when N chip gets connected securely.
Due to the young age of the KLJN idea, so far, only one
system has been built and tested [19] up to 2000 km range
with model line, see (Fig. 5). It was experimentally verified
against all the proposed invasive attack types and, in all
cases, the invasive eavesdropping was discovered during
the communication of a single bit. It had 99.98% fidelity,
and 0.19% information leak of the raw bits during passive
eavesdropping. The speed of the key exchange at 200 km
range was 1 bit/second [19], which is 4 times faster than the
Toshiba-NTT quantum key exchange system, at the same
distance [10]. Its price was a few hundred dollars and, in an
integrated form, its fabrication price will be similar to that
of an Eternet card in a PC.
It is an important practical aspect that the KLJN system can
be integrated on computer chips and secure communication
between units in a computer or machine can be established;
see Fig. 6 [20]. This property is also a unique feature of the
KLN system.
4. Can we avoid the single physical system and the
Second Law of Thermodynamics?
Recently, an interesting method was shown by Pao-Lo Liu
[21] where instead of using a physical system simply
random numbers were sent an reflected between Alice and
Bob while new random numbers (noise) were added to the
signal at each step. The protocol has been inspired by the
KLJN system and, at the first look, it may seem to be
secure. However, the system is neither physical nor it is
related to the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Moreover,
it must philosophically be obvious that such a system,
where Alice and Bob are physically separated, can hardly
be a good model of the KLJN system, where properly the
limited bandwidth connecting the resistances guarantees
that Alice and Bob form a single physical system that they
can manipulate simultaneously. In the protocol described in
[21] Eve can freely observe all the number values sent back
and forward and she has significant information for
cracking.
Indeed, on the contrary of its very young age, this protocol
was already cracked in its most secure state (the steady bit
state) [22] for a large class of noises that can be
transformed to white noise in the active frequency range by
filtering. Even though, Alice and Bob can choose an
idealistically band-limited noise, during changing the bit
and the related transients, the noise will lose its band-
limited nature and the system becomes vulnerable. Even
though this effect can be reduced by line filters, work in
progress indicates that similar methods can be developed
for arbitrary types of noises.
Finally, we mention an interesting idea [23,24] of Scheuer
and coworkers which was also inspired by the KLJN
cypher. The oscillation frequency in a long laser is varied
by Alice and Bob by selecting and placing filters at the two
ends of the laser. Similarly to the resistances in KLJN, they
have identical pairs of optical filters with different
frequency characteristics within a pair. This system is
physical however the Second Law of Thermodynamics is
not relevant. Furthermore, the photons can be detected and
measured in both directions because this system is not an
integral one either. The same philosophy which lead to
crack the Liu cypher suggests that this system may also be
non-secure at the unconditional level. However, how to
crack it is still an open question.
The final question about these new key exchange protocols
is the following: Though they can probably be cracked even
at the idealized situation, how can we utilize their limited
security at practical applications. Maybe, by using a
high-security seed-key obtained from the KLJN cypher they
can run for a longer period without the need of refreshing
that seed?
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